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COMMENT
RESPECTING CONGRESS'S EXPRESS INTENT:
CORRECTING THE SPLIT ALLOWING UNIONS AN
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER
LMRDA SECTION 501
Craig Nadeau+
Colorful, televised exchanges between senators and labor union leaders
detailing the misdeeds of a handful of unions left Americans in the late-1950s
with the impression that unions were merely organized crime syndicates.'
Congress responded to America's dissatisfaction with the state of unions by
enacting the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA).2 Congress's goal was to empower union members and thereby
place pressure on union leadership to clean up its act without overbearing
federal involvement.3 Section 501 of the LMRDA imposes fiduciary duties on
union officers and expressly enables union members to sue, for the benefit of
the union, officers who breach their fiduciary duties if the union fails to take
action.4 This enforcement mechanism functions similar to a shareholder's
derivative suit in corporate law.
5
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2008, The American University. Foremost, the author would like to thank his fiancee,
Lindsey, for her abundant love, patience, and support. The author also sincerely thanks Professor
Roger C. Hartley both for his expert guidance in this Comment and for nurturing the author's
interest in labor and employment law.
1. See Michael J. Nelson, Comment, Slowing Union Corruption: Reforming the Landrum-
Griffin Act to Better Combat Union Embezzlement, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 527, 532-37 (2000)
(describing the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management
Field's hearings on union corruption).
2. See id at 537-39; Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006)).
3. See S. REP. NO. 85-1417, at 452 (1958); see also Mallick v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
749 F.2d 771, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir.
1968).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (2006).
5. See Phillips, 403 F.2d at 831. A shareholder's derivative suit is the mechanism by
which a corporate shareholder may bring a claim on behalf of the corporation, and any award is
for the benefit of the corporation. DEBORAH A. DEMoyT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS:
LAW & PRACTICE §§ 1.1, 2.2 (2003). The derivative suit must be a claim on which the
corporation could have sued independently, and the shareholder often must request that the
corporation pursue the claim first. Id.
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In 1974, unions started to sue their current and former officers under section
501 for breaching fiduciary duties they owed to the unions even though the
LMRDA does not expressly provide for a union-initiated right of action.6 To
overcome this minor detail, unions asserted that the statute contained an
implied private right of action. 7 Suing under section 501 would give a federal
court subject-matter jurisdiction over a union's suit that otherwise would not
be available. 8 Since the late-1970s in federal district courts,9 and since the
mid-1990s in federal circuit courts, l0 a split has emerged over whether unions
could sue under section 501. Courts that hold no implied right of action exists
have pointed to the express language in section 501 that provides union
members with a right of action as evidence that Congress did not also intend a
right of action for unions."l On the other hand, courts finding that an implied
right of action exists have focused on the requirement that union members
must first demand that their unions take action before those union members
can sue, arguing that this requirement is evidence that Congress intended for
unions to sue under section 501.12
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence permitting implied rights of action has
been increasingly restrictive, and the Court has found few implied rights of
6. See, e.g., Safe Workers' Org., Chapter No. 2 v. Ballinger, 389 F. Supp. 903, 907 (S.D.
Ohio 1974) (declining to find jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 501 for an action initiated by a
union).
7. See, e.g., Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416, 1418 (11 th Cir. 1996)
(recounting that a union sued a former officer under section 501 for attempting to sell a union hall
that once belonged to the union). An implied private right of action, also commonly referred to as
an implied cause of action, allows a private litigant to sue another, alleging a violation of a statute
even though the statute does not provide explicitly for such a suit. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 766 (5th ed. 2003). Although this Comment addresses the possibility of
an implied statutory right of action, federal courts also imply rights of action under the United
States Constitution, which is analytically distinct. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (holding that the victim of a
warrantless search could sue for damages under the Fourth Amendment's unreasonable search
and seizure clause).
8. See Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 285, 289 (7th
Cir. 2009) ("Because Local 150 has a federal cause of action for violation of § 501, the district
court possessed jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to the general grant of federal-question
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and therefore erred in dismissing the suit."), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 442 (2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (granting federal subject-matter jurisdiction for
disputes arising under federal law).
9. Compare Ballinger, 389 F. Supp. at 908 (finding no right of action for unions under
section 501), with Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. Orr, No. CIV-1-76-86, 1977 WL 1661, at
*1 (E.D. Tenn. May 18, 1977) (inferring a right of action for unions under section 501).
10. Compare Bldg. Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500,
506-07 (9th Cir. 1989) (declining to imply a right of action for unions under section 501), with
Statham, 97 F.3d at 1421 (implying a right of action for unions under section 501).
11. See, e.g., Traweek, 867 F.2d at 506-07.
12. See Ward, 563 F.3d at 287-89; Statham, 97 F.3d at 1419-21.
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action in recent years.' 3  The Court has limited its inquiry to discerning
congressional intent to provide an implied right of action from the statutory
text, structure, and circumstances of enactment.14 Despite this direction from
the Court, lower courts interpreting section 501 have reached opposite
conclusions. 15
This Comment examines the circuit split among the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and district courts in
undecided circuits. First, this Comment introduces the LMRDA and its
disputed provisions. Next, it discusses the evolution and current state of the
Supreme Court's implied right of action jurisprudence. It then evaluates the
conflicting rationales and conclusions of the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits and the federal district courts in other circuits. This Comment then
sides with the Ninth Circuit and argues that the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
erred in finding that Congress intended to provide an implied right of action for
unions. This Comment also points to the constitutional separation of powers
and Article III limitations that must restrain a court's search for an implied
right of action. Finally, this Comment recommends that undecided district
courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court follow the Ninth Circuit's lead.
This Comment also proposes that the Supreme Court should adopt a mandatory
presumption that Congress does not intend to create an implied right of action
when the statute already includes an alternative express right of action.
I. DEFINING THE LIMITS OF LMRDA SECTION 501 AND IMPLIED RIGHTS OF
ACTION
A. The LMRDA: A Statute for Protecting Workers from Corrupt Unions
1. Congress Enacted the LMTRDA at the Height of Labor Union Corruption
Awareness
In 1957, the Senate formed the Select Committee on Improper Activities in
the Labor or Management Field, known as the McClellan Committee, which
conducted numerous hearings exposing corruption in labor unions." The
hearings captured the nation's attention and uncovered the lurid details of
13. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-88, 293 (2001); Ward, 563 F.3d at 285
(highlighting the importance the Supreme Court places on congressional intent in determining
whether an implied private right of action exists); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 781-
82 (outlining the Supreme Court's implied private right of action jurisprudence).
14. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
15. Compare Traweek, 867 F.2d 506-07 (concluding that there is no implied right of action
for unions under section 501), with Ward, 563 F.3d at 289 (finding an implied right of action for
unions under section 501), and Statham, 97 F.3d at 1421 (same).
16. See Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1968); Nelson, supra note 1, at
532-33.
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union misdoings, including the actions of Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamsters. 17
These improprieties included violence, racketeering, misappropriation of union
funds, and union officers profiting at the expense of union members. 8 In
response, the political pressure to enact federal legislation to regulate the
internal affairs of labor unions became overwhelming.
In 1959, Congress enacted the LMRDA,20 also known as the Landrum-
Griffin Act. 2' The reform was aimed at democratizing labor unions so that
union officers would be held accountable for their misdeeds, thereby
eliminating corruption without inordinate federal involvement in the internal
affairs of unions. 22 Congress's stated purpose in enacting the LMRDA was to
continue "to protect employees' rights to organize ' 23 and to implement
"legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of
employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of labor
,,24
organizations. The broad goal of the LMRDA was to protect the rights ofindividual union members from unscrupulous union leaders.25
2. Section 501: Defining Fiduciary Duties and a Right ofAction for Union
Members
Section 501(a) of the LMRDA defines in detail the general fiduciary duties
union officers owe to union members. 26 Union officers must use union money
17. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 533-37 (describing the McClellan Committee's pursuit of
Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamsters).
18. Phillips, 403 F.2d at 828.
19. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 536-38 (detailing early attempts at labor reform following
the McClellan Committee hearings).
20. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006)).
21. Nelson, supra note 1, at 528.
22. See S. REP. No. 85-1417, at 452 (1958); see also Phillips, 403 F.2d at 828-29; Mallick
v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 749 F.2d 771, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("By ensuring that
members could assert practical control over union policies, Congress attempted to prevent
corruption with a minimum of direct federal intervention in union decisionmaking.").
23. 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2006).
24. Id. § 401(b).
25. See Phillips, 403 F.2d at 829 ("The congressional history of the Landrum-Griffin Act
makes it abundantly clear that Congress sought to implement the recommendations of the
Committee and intended to deal solely with the activities of union leaders as they affected their
members."); Local 1150 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Santamaria, 162 F. Supp. 2d 68, 78 & n.6 (D.
Conn. 2001); United Transp. Union v. Bottalico, 120 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Spear, Wilderman, Borish, Endy, Spear & Runckel, 995 F. Supp. 564,
570 & n. I1 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that many of the LMRDA's enforcement provisions require
union members to sue or to initiate the enforcement action). The entire first title of the LMRDA
is a bill of rights for union members. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, §§ 101-05, 73 Stat. 519, 522-23 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (2006)).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006). Subsection (a) provides in full:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization
occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group. It
[Vol. 59:821
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for the benefit of the union, not act adversely to or have a conflicting interest
with the union, and must submit to the union any profit gained while acting on
27behalf of the union. In addition, this subsection voids exculpatory provisions
in union bylaws or constitutions and exculpatory resolutions enacted by union
bodies that absolve a union officer of any breach.28  Section 501(b) provides
that when a union officer breaches his section 501(a) fiduciary duty and the
union "refuse[s] or fail[s] to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or
other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after" a member demands that
the union take action, the union member may sue the breaching officer in
federal court to recover damages on behalf of the union. 29 A union member
must, however, seek leave of the court before the suit can proceed.30
3. Scraps of Legislative History Concerning Section 501
Senate Bill 1555, which became the LMRDA, did not include the general
fiduciary duty and enforcement provisions when it was reported out of
is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account the special problems and
functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and property solely for the benefit
of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the same in
accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies
adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party
or in behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from
holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interest
of such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received by him
in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his
direction on behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory provision in the
constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution
of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the




29. Id. § 501(b). Subsection (b) provides in full:
When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor organization is
alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this section and the
labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover
damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a reasonable time
after being requested to do so by any member of the labor organization, such member
may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any district court of the
United States or in any State court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages or
secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization.
No such proceeding shall be brought except upon leave of the court obtained upon
verified application and for good cause shown, which application may be made ex
parte. The trial judge may allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any action under
this subsection to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting the suit at the instance of the
member of the labor organization and to compensate such member for any expenses
necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection with the litigation.
Id. Subsection (c) criminalizes embezzlement of union funds by union officers. Id. § 501(c).
30. Id. § 501(b).
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committee. 31 However, Senate bills that were not reported out of committee
included such provisions, including one bill that expressly allowed unions to
sue along with union members. 33 The committee report included a minority
statement by Senators Barry Goldwater and Everett McKinley Dirksen that
decried the failure to establish a general fiduciary duty.3 4 The senators argued
that enacting a general fiduciary duty was necessary because union officers
held money for the benefit of union members and state law provided
inadequate remedies for union members to hold union officers accountable for
misappropriating funds.35 The senators reasoned that the lack of a general
fiduciary duty "constitute[d] a failure to provide what could be the most
effective possible device for enabling rank-and-file union members themselves
to control financial misconduct on the part of their officials." 36  In the
committee report, the senators proposed an amendment to "[i]mpose[]
fiduciary obligations, enforceable by union members, on the officials of labor
unions." 37 When Senate Bill 1555 reached the Senate floor, Senator John
Little McClellan introduced an amendment that imposed fiduciary duties on
union officers for handling union money and property.38 The Senate adopted
the amendment. 39 The bill, before the McClellan amendment, allowed union
members to sue union officers on behalf of the union if the officers were
convicted of embezzling, and the McClellan amendment used this enforcement
31. See S. 1555, 86th Cong. § 109 (1959) (as reported by S. Comm. on Labor & Pub.
Welfare, Apr. 14, 1959) (allowing suits by union members only if the union officer was convicted
of embezzlement), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 358-59 (1959) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LMRDA].
32. See S. 1137, 86th Cong. § 301 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA, supra note 31, at 294-95; S. 748, 86th Cong. § 301 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 109-10.
33. S. 748, 86th Cong. § 301 (1959) (providing that action against a union officer for breach
of fiduciary duty may be brought "by one or more of the principal officers of such labor
organization" or "by any one or more of the members of the labor organization"), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 109-10.
34. S. REP. No. 86-187, at 72 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA,
supra note 31, at 468.
35. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 86-741, at 7 (1959) ("The members of a labor organization
are the real owners of the money and property of such organizations and are entitled to a full
accounting of all transactions involving such money and property."), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 765.
36. S. REP. No. 86-187, at 72 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA,
supra note 31, at 468.
37. S. REP. No. 86-187, at 87 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA,
supra note 31, at 483.
38. 105 CONG. REc. 6523 (1959); see also S. 1555, 86th Cong. § 610 (1959) (as passed by
Senate, Apr. 25, 1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at
576-77.
39. 105 CONG. REC. 6528-29 (1959).
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scheme for the additional, though still narrow, fiduciary duties imposed on
union officers.4 °
The language that is now section 501 existed in the House version of the bill
when it was reported out of committee.4 1 In the House committee report, the
committee emphasized the importance of fiduciary duties, noting that
"[a]lthough the common law covers the matter, we considered it important to
write the fiduciary principle explicitly into Federal labor legislation.
42
Concerning the enforcement mechanism for the fiduciary duty, the committee
report only restated the language of the bill permitting union members to sue
for breaches of fiduciary duties when the union declined to sue.43 The House
also passed its bill.44
The final bill that emerged from the conference committee included the
House bill's broader fiduciary duty language45 and the provision granting
union members a right of action without any explanation in the conference
40. Id at 6529-30. Compare S. 1555, 86th Cong. § 109(b) (1959) (as reported by S.
Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, Apr. 14, 1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA, supra note 31, at 358-59, with S. 1555, 86th Cong. § 209(b) (1959) (as passed by
Senate, Apr. 25, 1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at
538-39.
41. See H.R. 8342, 86th Cong. § 501 (1959) (as reported by H.R. Comm. on Educ. & Labor,
July 30, 1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 730-32.
The Senate passed Senate Bill 1555 before House Bill 8342 was introduced. Compare S. 1555,
86th Cong. (1959) (as passed by Senate, Apr. 25, 1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 516, with H.R. 8342, 86th Cong. (1959) (as reported by H.R.
Comm. on Educ. & Labor, July 30, 1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA,
supra note 31, at 687. During the House subcommittee hearings, discussion of union officers'
statutory fiduciary duties focused on whether the fiduciary duties in Senate Bill 1555 were
inadequate or too harsh. See, e.g., Labor-Management Reform Legislation: Hearing on H.R.
3540, H.R. 3302, H.R. 4473, and H.R. 4474 Before a J. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Educ. &
Labor, 86th Cong. 1604 (1959) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Sen. Barry
Goldwater) (criticizing the Senate bill's fiduciary-duty enforcement measures as "grant[ing] the
union member so little in the way of an effective remedy that he would be better off, in most
cases, in bringing his suit under State law"); id. at 1489-91 (statement of George Meany,
President, AFL-CIO) (attacking the fiduciary provisions in the Senate bill "as among its most
objectionable" because such a broad fiduciary duty would expose a union to suits by union
members who simply disagree with how the union legitimately chooses to spend its money).
42. H.R. REP. No. 86-741, at 81 (1959) ("The general principles stated in the bill are
familiar to the courts, both State and Federal, and therefore incorporate a large body of existing
law applicable to trustees, and a wide variety of agents."), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 839.
43. See H.R. REP. No. 86-741, at 82 (1959) ("The bill also authorizes a union member to
bring an action against any official or agent who violates his fiduciary obligations, if the union
refuses to sue-and again such member may recover counsel fees and costs if he prevails."),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 839.
44. 105 CONG. REC. at 15,891-92.
45. Compare Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-
257, § 501, 73 Stat. 519, 535-36 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 501 (2006)), with H.R. REP. NO. 86-
741, at 44-45 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at
802-03.
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46report. Both the Senate and House passed the legislation, which became theLMRDA. 47
B. The Supreme Court's Restrictive Implied Private Right of Action
Jurisprudence
Implying private rights of action in statutes is a relatively modem
48phenomenon. The Supreme Court first implied rights of action under
provisions of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 because the statute did not have
any judicial enforcement mechanism, and the Court found that Congress
intended the statute to be more potent.49  The Supreme Court has evolved
through three analytical approaches with respect to implied rights of action
over the past half-century. 0 The Supreme Court began with expansive
approaches, queuing lower courts to find many implied rights of action in the
1960s and 1970s, 51 but the Supreme Court has cemented a restrictive approach
in the past three decades and has found fewer implied rights of action.
52
1. J.I. Case v. Borak: As Long as an Implied Right ofAction Effectuates
Congress's Purpose
In 1964, the Supreme Court announced the first, most expansive, and
subsequently abandoned approach used to decide whether a statute contained
an implied right of action. 53  In J.I. Case v. Borak, the Court permitted a
shareholder to sue for damages under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
46. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 501; H.R. REP. NO. 86-1147, at
35 (Conf. Rep.) (failing to comment on the provisions contained in section 501), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 3 1, at 939.
47. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006)).
48. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 732-42 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(providing a history of the Court's implied private right of action jurisprudence).
49. Id. at 733-34 (suggesting that the Board of Mediation was legally powerless to enforce
the Act); see also Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213-14
(1944) (finding an implied private right of action in the Railway Labor Act); Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944) (same); Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed. No. 40,
300 U.S. 515, 545 (1937) (same); Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks,
281 U.S. 548, 560-70 (1930) (same). In Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, the Supreme
Court first invoked the terms "inference of a private right of action," but the case involved
referencing a federal statute to develop common-law negligence standards of care, not implying a
federal right of action from a statute. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916);
see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting).
50. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 382 (4th ed. 2003).
51. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 741-42 (Powell, J., dissenting) (showing that lower federal
courts found numerous implied rights of action in the few years following Cort v. Ash).
52. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 781-82.
53. See id at 781; see also J.1. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) ("It is for the
federal courts 'to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief' where federally secured
rights are invaded.").
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Act of 1934-alleging that the company circulated a false proxy statement that
facilitated a merger--even though the statute itself did not mention a private
right of action.54 The statute did expressly ban the distribution of false proxy
statements.55 Holding that courts have a "duty ... to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose," the
Supreme Court reasoned that judicial remedies were necessary to effectuate
Congress's purpose of protecting investors under the statute.
56
2. Toward Reining In Implied Rights ofAction: The Cort v. Ash Four-
Factor Test
In deciding Cort v. Ash in 1975, the Supreme Court enumerated several
factors to consider when determining whether Congress intended an implied
right of action in a particular statute:57 (1) Is the statute meant to benefit this
type of plaintiff?. (2) Did Congress intend, explicitly or implicitly, to grant or
withhold the remedy sought?59 (3) Does implying a remedy comport with the
purposes of the statute? 6° (4) Is the remedy traditionally a matter of state law,
rendering a federal remedy inappropriate?6 1 After applying these factors, the
Court found no implied private right of action in the statute before it-a
criminal statute that prohibited corporations from contributing to political
62
campaigns.
Four years later, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court
applied the Cort factors and reached the opposite conclusion, finding an
63implied right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr., vigorously dissented, arguing that congressional
intent is the only permissible inquiry.64 He denounced the other three Cortfactors as "invit[ing] independent judicial lawmaking" and giving courts a
54. Borak, 377 U.S. at 427-28, 433-35.
55. Id. at427 n.1.
56. Id. at 432-33.





62. Id. at 79-85.
63. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-709 (1979). A woman claiming that
she was not admitted to medical school because of her gender sued the University of Chicago and
Northwestern University under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits
gender-based discrimination in schools receiving federal funding. Id. at 680 & nn.1-2. The
section did not include an express private right of action. Id. at 683.
64. Id. at 730-31, 740 (Powell, J., dissenting). In his concurrence, Justice William
Rehnquist echoed some of the same constitutional principles espoused by Justice Powell, stating
that federal courts lacked common-law power and must exercise more restraint in enforcing laws
passed by Congress than states do in enforcing statutes. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Given these constitutional limitations, Justice Rehnquist urged federal courts to limit the implied
right of action inquiry to discerning congressional intent. Id.
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
justification "to substitute [their] own views as to the desirability of private
enforcement. ' 65 He implored that inferring a right of action where Congress in
fact did not intend one has dire constitutional implications.66 Because Article I
of the Constitution grants Congress the exclusive power to legislate, 67 allowing
Congress to shirk its responsibilities or pennitting courts to legislate from the
bench without accountability "denigrates the democratic process." 68 Justice
Powell further emphasized that Article Ill vests Congress with the sole power
to define the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, yet implying private rights of
actions into statutes in which Congress did not provide such rights effectively
gives to courts the power to create their own jurisdiction.69 Justice Powell's
concerns foreshadowed the Court's current restrictive jurisprudence. 70
3. Modern Restrictive Approach: Congressional Intent for an Implied Right
ofAction Is Determinative
One month after Cannon, the Court effectively overruled the Cort four-
factor approach in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.7 1 Concluding that the
"central inquiry" is congressional intent, the Court declined to apply the other
three factors. 72 The Court held that a statute requiring brokerage firms to file
reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did not include
an implied right of action for clients to sue a brokerage firm accountant for
misstatements in the reports because the statutory language lacked any
evidence of legislative intent to create a private right of action.73
65. Id. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 742 ("'[T]he unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear'
and compels us to abandon the implication doctrine of Cort." (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938))).
67. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.").
68. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743-47 (Powell, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 746-47; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.").
70. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also George D. Brown, Of
Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine 's Implications for the Nature and Role of the
Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REv. 617, 636 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court's acceptance
of Justice Powell's critiques in Cannon led to its current restrictive jurisprudence); Richard W.
Creswell, The Separation of Powers Implications of Implied Rights of Action, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 973, 987-89 (1983) (suggesting that the Court's congressional intent test allows it to avoid
the difficulties raised by Justice Powell's constitutional arguments).
71. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979); see also Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979) (affirming the rejection of
the Cort factors in Touche Ross and finding congressional intent dispositive).
72. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568, 575-76.
73. Id. at 562, 569-71, 575-76 (emphasizing that statutory reporting provisions are intended
to enable federal regulatory agencies to perform their oversight functions and do not impose
private liability). In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall applied all four Cort factors and
concluded that there was an implied right of action. Id. at 580-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 59:821
No Implied Right of Action Under LMRDA § 501
A few months later, the Supreme Court confirmed the new direction of its
implied right of action jurisprudence in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
(TAMA) v. Lewis.74 In TAMA, the Court held that the ultimate question in an
implied right of action analysis is whether Congress intended to create a
private right of action even though it did not expressly provide one.75 The
TAMA Court specifically articulated the proper inquiry: "Such an intent may
appear implicitly in the language or structure of the statute, or in the
circumstances of its enactment. ' 7  The Court warned: "[W]here a statute
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of
reading others into it."' 77 Applying the restrictive inquiry, the Court refused to
imply a private right of action for damages into a section of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, which imposed "federal fiduciary standards" on
investment advisors. The Court reasoned that the statute already provided for
criminal and administrative enforcement and that Congress had provided
express private rights of action elsewhere in the Act.
79
Since Touche Ross and TAMA, the Supreme Court has rejected almost every
invitation to imply a right of action into federal statutes, with the exception of
74. TAMA, 444 U.S. at 23-24. Justice Powell concurred that TAMA was compatible with
his dissent in Cannon. Id. at 25 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31,
749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. TAMA, 444 U.S. at 15-16.
76. Id. at 18; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) ("'[U]nless this
congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or
some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not
exist."' (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981))).
77. TAMA, 444 U.S. at 19. This statement is also consistent with the pre-Borak
jurisprudence, under which the Court would find an implied right of action only when the whole
statute was devoid of any enforcement mechanism. See, e.g., Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v.
Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568-69 (1930) (holding that an injunction was lawful
because Congress clearly intended the prohibition in the Railway Labor Act to be enforceable
even though Congress provided no express statutory remedy). The statutory canon of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius provides: "[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of
the other, or of the alternative." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009); see 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBLE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
47:23 (7th ed. 2007). This canon derives from common sense and "expresses the learning of
common experience that when people say one thing they do not mean something else." SINGER
& SINGER, supra, § 47:24.
78. TAMA, 444 U.S. at 17-19, 24. Justice Byron White's dissenting opinion-joined by
Justices William Brennan, Marshall, and John Paul Stevens-thoroughly analyzed the case using
the Cort factors and concluded that the Court should imply a right of action into the Act. Id. at
25-36 (White, J., dissenting).
79. Id at 20-21 (majority opinion). Focusing on the language of the statute, the Court
found that an implied equitable remedy for rescission and restitution existed in federal court
because a different section of the statute declared certain contracts void. Id. at 18-19. The Court
reasoned that Congress must have intended a mechanism to void a contract, including the
traditional remedies of rescission and restitution. Id. at 19.
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Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran. In Curran, the Court
found an implied right of action for violations of the Commodity Exchange
Act.81 The Court reasoned that Congress intended for private rights of action
to continue to be implied under the statute because federal courts routinely
implied a right of action in the statute before Congress amended it.8' The
Court observed that Congress would have amended the provisions used to
imply private rights of action if it opposed creating them.
83
The Supreme Court also suggested another caveat to the restrictive approach
by indicating that it might treat statutes enacted before 1975 more leniently.
84
In Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1263, the
Court, in finding no private right of action for federal employees to enforce
their statutory right to fair representation by their union, reasoned that
Congress was aware when it enacted the 1978 statute that the Court no longer
was implying rights of action freely, but instead was conducting a
"straightforward inquiry" into congressional intent. 85 The Court's reasoning
left open the possibility that it might more readily imply a private right of
action into a pre-1975 statute because Congress was not yet on notice of the
Court's more restrictive approach to implying private rights of action.
86
In its 2001 Alexander v. Sandoval decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the restrictive approach it first adopted in Touche Ross and perhaps further
restricted its implied private right of action inquiry.87 The Alexander Court
refused to find an implied right of action in a disparate-impact regulation
promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.88 Writing
for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia clarified that a court must find that
Congress intended "to create not just a private right but also a private remedy"
• • 89
for a right of action to be implied. Justice Scalia reiterated that Congress's
80. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 781-82. But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394-95 (1982) (finding that an implied right of action
exists).
81. Curran, 456 U.S. at 355-56, 394-95. Justice Powell disagreed with this decision
because it eroded the restrictive approach he championed. See id. at 395-99 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
82. Id. at 381-82 (majority opinion).
83. Id.
84. See Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 536
(1989).
85. Id. at 529, 536.
86. See id. at 536. But see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287-88 (2001) (finding
that the statutory text is the central inquiry and that "contemporary legal context" has never had
dispositive weight). Therefore, the Curran ratification exception is likely no longer viable. See
Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287-88.
87. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286-93; see also LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS
249 (3d ed. 2009) (suggesting that Justice Scalia's opinion "demands express statutory language"
as evidence of congressional intent in order to find an implied right of action).
88. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 293.
89. Id. at 286.
[Vol. 59:821
No Implied Right of Action Under LMRDA § 501
intent is determinative in interpreting the statute because Congress must create
the private right of action. 9° Absent clear congressional intent, courts may not
imply a right of action "no matter how desirable that might be as a policy
matter, or how compatible with the statute." 91  Justice Scalia reiterated the
traditional canon of statutory interpretation that "[t]he express provision of one
method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to
preclude others." 92 He further noted that the suggestion can be strong enough
to "preclude[] a finding of congressional intent," even when other statutory
language might imply otherwise or where the statute engenders "substantive
private rights. '93  In addition, the Court recently revived Justice Powell's
Article III and separation-of-powers concerns in its Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. decision, declining to find an implied
right of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
C. The Circuit Split on Whether Unions May Sue Their Own Officers Under
LMRDA Section 501
Despite the consistency and clarity of the Supreme Court's restrictive
implied right of action jurisprudence over the last three decades,95 federal
courts have reached opposite conclusions on whether section 501 of the
LMRDA includes an implied right of action.96 In two dozen cases, unions
have argued that they have the right to bring a section 501 action against their
own officers or former officers to hold the officers accountable in federal court
for breaching their fiduciary duty as defined in LMRDA section 501. 97 A
majority of district courts98 and the Ninth Circuit99 have found that unions may
not sue under section 501, holding that only union members can sue under
section 501. Conversely, a minority of district courts 00 and the Seventh and
90. Id. at 286-87 ("Having sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress's intent, we
will not accept respondents' invitation to have one last drink.").
91. Id.
92. Id. at 290.
93. Id.
94. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164-65 (2008)
(quoting Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon and stating that "[t]he determination of who can seek
a remedy has significant consequences for the reach of federal power").
95. See supra notes 71-94 and accompanying text.
96. Compare Bldg. Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500,
506-07 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no implied right of action for unions), with Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 289 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding an implied right
of action for unions), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 442 (2009), and Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v.
Statham, 97 F.3d 1416, 1421 (11 th Cir. 1996) (same).
97. See cases cited infra notes 112 and 154.
98. Compare cases cited infra note 112, with cases cited infra note 154.
99. Traweek, 867 F.2d at 506-07.
100. Compare cases cited infra note 154, with cases cited infra note 112.
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Eleventh Circuits' 01 have found that unions may sue under section 501. Even
the Supreme Court has noted the conflict in interpretations, 102 but has declined
the opportunity to resolve it.
103
1. No Implied Right ofAction: An Express Remedy for Union Members
Means Congress Did Not Intend One for Unions
a. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit's 1989 decision in Building Material & Dump Truck
Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek was the first decision from a United States court
of appeals to consider whether a union could sue under section 501.104 In
Traweek, two union officers used union funds to pay for the legal defense of a
union organizer who was indicted on arson charges. 10 5  The local union
expelled the union officers and then sued them in federal court pursuant to
section 501, adding state fraud claims through supplemental jurisdiction. 0 6
The district court allowed the suit without any discussion of whether the union
could sue under section 501.107
101. Ward, 563 F.3d at 289; Statham, 97 F.3d at 1421.
102. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 374 n.16 (1990).
The Court wrote:
Section 501(b), by its terms, does not establish a private right of action for a union
itself. Rather, it provides that a suit may be brought in district court by a union member
when a union officer is alleged to have breached his duties "and the labor organization
or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages or secure an
accounting or other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being requested to
do so by any member of the labor organization." That language certainly contemplates
that a union may bring suit against its officers in some forum, but it does not expressly
provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Courts have reached inconsistent
positions on the question whether a union may bring suit under § 501. We need not
resolve that question here. Rather, we assume, without deciding, that a union may
invoke the remedial provisions of § 501(b).
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982)) (citations omitted).
103. See id; see also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Ward, 130 S. Ct. 442
(Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 09-196) (denying certiorari).
104. Traweek, 867 F.2d at 506 (determining that Congress did not intend for unions to sue
under section 501); see also Ward, 563 F.3d at 283-84.
105. Bldg. Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, No. CV 81-4226-RMT,
1986 WL 426, at *1-3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1986), affrd in part, rev'd in part, 867 F.2d 500 (9th
Cir. 1989). The parties vigorously disputed whether using union funds to pay for the legal
defense was improper. See id. at *2. The expelled officers thought paying for the legal defense
was consistent with the union's constitution and bylaws, and thought an outside legal opinion
supported their position, but the other local union leadership disagreed. Id.
106. Traweek, 867 F.2d at 505.
107. Traweek, 1986 WL 426, at *1 (limiting the action to the issues raised by the parties,
which did not include jurisdiction under section 501).
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Reversing in part, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court lacked
jurisdiction because a union could not sue under section 501.108 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that "[t]he clear language of the statute does not contemplate
a suit brought by a union," instead it contemplates an individual union member
being able to sue "if a union refuses or fails to sue" upon the union member's
request. 10 9 The court determined that the statutory language requiring a party
to request the court's permission to sue evidenced Congress's intent that only
union members have a right to sue because a union recovering its own funds
would not need consent.' The Ninth Circuit emphasized that section 501
should be construed narrowly given the "federal policy of noninterference in
the internal affairs of union and labor matters."'
I
b. Selected District Court Decisions from Undecided Circuits
Several district courts in the undecided circuits have concluded that section
501 of the LMRDA does not contain an implied private right of action for
unions.' 12  In International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Spear, Wilderman,
108. Traweek, 867 F.2d at 507.
109. Id. at 506.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. These cases present the most fully developed arguments advanced against finding an
implied right of action in section 501. It is worth noting that in 1974, the Southern District of
Ohio, located in the Sixth Circuit, was the first court to decide whether unions could sue under
section 501, but it never considered the Supreme Court's implied right of action jurisprudence.
See Safe Workers' Org., Chapter No. 2 v. Ballinger, 389 F. Supp. 903, 906-08 (S.D. Ohio 1974)
(failing to discuss implied right of action jurisprudence in reaching its holding); Int'l Union of
Elec. Workers v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416, 1418 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996) (listing Ballinger as the
earliest case to decide the issue). In Ballinger, the Safe Workers' Organization union sued its
own officers because the officers, without certification, operated the union as an affiliate of the
UAW, closed the Safe Workers' bank account, and commingled Safe Workers' funds with the
UAW local's funds. Ballinger, 389 F. Supp. at 905-06. The court held that the union could not
sue because it was not the proper plaintiff given that section 501 only authorizes suits by union
members against officers and therefore requires unions to pursue remedies under state law. Id. at
907-08.
Other district court cases have found no implied right of action for unions under section 501.
See, e.g., Int'l Union, Sec., Police & Fire Prof'ls v. United Gov't Sec. Officers, No. Civ.A.04-
2242-KHV, 2004 WL 3019430, at *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 2004); Local 15 of Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. O'Reilly, No. 02 C 6464, 2003 WL 29896, at *2-3 (N.D. I11. Jan. 2, 2003); Dunlop-
McCullen v. Pascarella, No. 97Civ.0195(PKL)(DFE), 2002 WL 31521012, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 13, 2002); Local 443, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pisano, 753 F. Supp. 434, 436 (D. Conn.
1991); Local 191, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Rossetti, CIV. A. No. B-90-74(WWE), 1990 WL
128241, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug. 23, 1990); Crosley v. Katz, Civ. A. No. 88-2437, 1988 WL 94283,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1988); Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Freeman, 683 F. Supp. 1190, 1192
(N.D. I11. 1988); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Byrd, 659 F. Supp. 274, 276 (S.D. Miss.
1986); Graphic Arts Int'l Union v. Graphics Arts Int'l Union, Local 529, 529 F. Supp. 587, 594
(W.D. Mo. 1982); Stanton v. Shields, No. C-79-1211, 1979 WL 2009, at *1, (N.D. Cal. July 20,
1979); Teamsters, Local 20 v. Leu, No. C 76-221, 1976 WL 1685, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22,
1976).
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Borish, Endy, Spear & Runckel, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, located
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, relied heavily on
the legislative history, purpose, and statutory text to conclude that section 501
does not grant unions a right of action. 113  The court concluded that the
legislative history of section 501 did not evince any intent to allow unions
access to federal court."l 4 Rather, the court reasoned that the purpose of the
LMRDA was to establish rights for union members and provide "access to
federal court to vindicate those rights as against their union leadership."
1 15
Further, the legislative history, if anything, demonstrated that Congress
intentionally excluded unions from being able to sue under section 501.116 The
court also found that the language requiring unions to act first did not indicate
a congressional preference for unions to act instead of union members.
117
Rather, the language effectuated Congress's intent to prevent union-member-
initiated suits that were "frivolous or harassing."' 1 8  Finally, the court
explained that unions have satisfactory causes of action under state law, such
as "fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment,"
which were all raised in the suit through supplemental jurisdiction. 119
Two district courts in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit provide the most recent published opinions finding no implied right of
action under section 501 .120 The District Court for the Southern District of
New York in United Transportation Union v. Bottalico employed the
presumption that Congress did not intend to include an unmentioned remedy
113. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Spear, Wilderman, Borish, Endy, Spear & Runckel, 995
F. Supp. 564, 567-68 (E.D. Pa. 1998). To the extent the judge implied that the Supreme Court's
footnote in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund supported his argument, the
judge was misguided. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 374
n. 16 (1990). Rather, the footnote illustrated the Court's neutral position in finding that the statute
does not expressly provide a right of action for unions, which is not disputed. See id.
114. Spear, 995 F. Supp. at 570. International Longshoremen's Association, a union, sued a
former union officer, the officer's attorney, and the attorney's law firm, for breach of fiduciary
duty because the law firm was paid out of the local's treasury for a case challenging the
international's revocation of the local's charter. Id. at 565.
115. Id. at 570. The court also noted that the statute itself was a compromise between the
policies of "noninterference in the internal affairs of unions and labor matters, and empowerment
of individual union members within their unions." Id. As a result, the court reasoned that





119. Id. at 573. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania's analysis was not consistent with
current Supreme Court precedent because it relied more on legislative history than the text of the
statute and applied the Cort factors without acknowledging that the Supreme Court had made the
second factor, legislative intent, the determinative inquiry. Compare Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 286-93 (2001), with Spear, 995 F. Supp. at 570-73.
120. See Local 1150 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Santamaria, 162 F. Supp. 2d 68, 76 (D. Conn.
2001); United Transp. Union v. Bottalico, 120 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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because it provided an express remedy in the statute. 121  The court then
weighed other factors to ascertain whether the presumption could be overcome
and concluded that it could not. 122 Specifically, the court emphasized that: (1)
the "demand requirement" was not "futile" because of state remedies; (2)
union members were the LMRDA's intended beneficiaries; and (3) the
legislative history did not support anything more than Congress's intent to
create a fiduciary duty and enable union members to sue.
123
In Local 1150 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Santamaria, the
District Court for the District of Connecticut undertook an extensive
examination of section 501's legislative history. 124  The court rejected the
argument that Congress must have intended for unions to be able to sue
because union members have to demand that the union sue first.
125
Specifically, the court concluded that the legislative history demonstrated that
Congress intended for unions to invoke state causes of action for an officer's
breach of fiduciary duties, but the court was concerned about the lack of state
causes of action for union members. 126 The district court further noted that
Congress intended subsection (b) to be the remedy for subsection (a), which
established the fiduciary rights. 12 The court summarized its findings of
Congress's intent for section 501 as follows:
Congress anticipated that unions often would be able to resolve
problems internally or through state common law remedies, but,
based on Congressional findings of widespread corruption in union
leadership, granted members a federal remedy in those situations
121. Bottalico, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 409. United Transportation Union sued officers of union
subsidiaries alleging that the officers breached their fiduciary duties. Id at 407-08.
122. Id at 409.
123. Id. at 409-10. The Southern District of New York exposed the Eleventh Circuit's faulty
reasoning in mischaracterizing two pieces of legislative history used to support its holding. Id.;
see also Santamaria, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 78-79 (finding that the Eleventh Circuit's reading of the
legislative history was incorrect); Spear, 995 F. Supp. at 570 (same). This case illustrates that
lower courts still use the Cort factors in their analyses to determine legislative intent, even though
the Supreme Court has rejected three of them. See Santamaria, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 76; Bottalico,
120 F. Supp. 2d at 408; see also Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286-88 (inquiring only into congressional
intent).
124. See Santamaria, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 77-79. Teamsters Local 1150 sued former officers
of the local who were voted out of office for breaching their fiduciary duties. Id at 70-71.
Before leaving office, the former officers allegedly arranged for three full-time clerical staff
members of the local, who were members of Local 1150 and fiercely loyal to the former officers,
to withdraw from Local 1150 and become members of a different union. Id. at 72. The former
officers then signed a collective bargaining agreement making the clerical staff members
impossible to replace and giving the staff members generous compensation. Id at 72. The
officers signed this agreement only after they lost the election, and it was fixed to last for the term
of the incoming officers. Id.
125. Id. at 76-77.
126. Id at 77-79.
127. Id. at 79.
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
where the union failed to act to protect its interests and the interests
of its members. 1
28
As in Bottalico, the court also reasoned that an express remedy provided by the
statute weighed against finding a remedy implicitly.129 The district court held
that Congress did not intend unions to have a right of action under section
501. 130
2. Implied Right ofAction: Resisting the Supreme Court's Restrictive
Jurisprudence
a. The Eleventh Circuit
In International Union of Electronic Workers v. Statham, a local union
disbanded because the brewery where the union members worked closed. 131
When the former local's officers attempted to sell the old union hall, the
local's affiliated international union sued, claiming breach of fiduciary duty
under section 501 because the international union's constitution required
disbanded unions to hand over all property to the international union.'32 The
district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
concluding that unions could not sue under section 501.133 The Eleventh
Circuit reversed. 1
34
The Eleventh Circuit advanced several reasons for its conclusion. First, the
statutory requirement that members must ask the union to sue first shows that
Congress preferred that the union sue and therefore intended that unions have
access to federal courts. 13 5 Second, the court found that the legislative history
demonstrated that Congress created federally defined fiduciary duties because
state-law causes of action were insufficient.'36 Third, the court dismissed the
argument that the explicit expression of one remedy excludes other implicit
remedies. 137 In rejecting this well-established principle, the court reasoned that
Congress thought a right of action for unions would be implicit in defining a
fiduciary duty, but that allowing individuals to have derivative rights of action
"was more extraordinary and therefore had to be spelled out. 138  Fourth,
allowing individuals, but not unions, to sue in federal court would "encourage
128. Id. at 80.
129. Id.
130. Id. at81.
131. Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416, 1418 (11 th Cir. 1996).
132. Id. The international union also asserted a breach of contract claim pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1421-22.
135. Id. at 1419-20.
136. Id. at 1420.
137. Id. at 1420-21.
138. Id. at 1421.
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the unions to refuse their members' requests to sue offending officials" so that
the union could secure federal jurisdiction derivatively through the union
member.1 39 Alternatively, the court continued, if unions could sue in federal
court, then "the demand requirement [would] function[] properly, to give the
union a chance to sue first, if it will.'
b. The Seventh Circuit
Breaking the circuit-split tie, the Seventh Circuit in International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 150 v. Ward held unions could sue former officers
under section 501.141 The union, Local 150, sued Ward, its former treasurer,
for purchasing a property he knew the union wanted to purchase. 142  Ward
falsely told the seller that the union was not interested in buying the property
and told the union president that it had been sold to someone else. 43 The
district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
concluding that unions had no right to sue under section 501.144
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by establishing that section 501(a)
creates federal rights for unions by defining the fiduciary duty union officers
owe. 145  Carefully mirroring the Supreme Court's method of analysis in
Alexander v. Sandoval, the court commenced its search for Congress's implicit
intent to create a right of action for unions in the text of the statute. 146 The
court found that the officer's duty "to account to" the union for improperly
attained money hints at a federal remedy.147 Next, it found that the provision
prohibiting general exculpatory clauses would not make sense unless the union
could sue union officers who could then invoke the exculpatory clause as a
defense.
148
Turning to section 501(b), the court decided that the express right of action
for union members strengthened the case that Congress intended an implied
right of action for unions. 149 The court remarked that the statute was structured
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 285, 289 (7th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 442 (2009).
142. Id. at 277.
143. Id. at 277-78.
144. Id. at 278.
145. Id. at 286.
146. Id. at 285-87; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
147. Ward, 563 F.3d at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)
(2006) (requiring officers to account to the union for profits earned).
148. Ward, 563 F.3d at 287; see also 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (prohibiting general exculpatory
clauses).
149. Ward, 563 F.3d at 288; see also 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (bestowing union members with an
express right of action). Like the court in Statham, the Seventh Circuit noted that the express
provision granting union members a right of action was necessary because subsection (a) did not
suggest such an action. Ward, 563 F.3d at 288.
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to operate like a shareholder's derivative suit, whereby shareholders can sue
based on a claim "'on which the corporation could have sued."' ' 50 Therefore,
the court concluded that the union had the right to sue in federal court. 15' The
Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion by characterizing the union's right to
sue as the "primary" right from which the union members' right was
derived.' 52  It then concluded that it would be "anomalous" to relegate the
union's primary right to state court while permitting members to sue in federal
court to enforce their subordinate right. 3  The Seventh Circuit ended its
inquiry without considering the legislative history of section 501, satisfied that
it found Congress's intent to create an implied right of action from the
statutory language alone.'
54
150. Ward, 563 F.3d at 288 (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The Seventh Circuit also recognized that this system would encourage unions to
deny demands by union members to sue in order to achieve federal jurisdiction. Id. (citing
Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Int'l Ass'n v. Benjamin, 776 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (N.D.
Ind. 1991)).
154. Id. at 288 & n.9, 289. The district court opinions finding an implied right of action
under section 501 offer no new arguments or insights, unlike the district court opinions finding
that no implied right of action exists. See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, S.S. Clerks Local
1624 v. Va. Int'l Terminals, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1335, 1339-40 (E.D. Va. 1996) (reaching the same
conclusion as the circuit courts). However, the District Court for the Northern District of
California did attempt to distinguish itself from the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Traweek because
the Traweek Court only considered section 50 1(b) and did not address implying a right of action
in section 501(a). Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Roselli, No. C 09-00404 WHA, 2009 WL
1382259, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2009). In Roselli, the judge made a distinction without a
difference, and the Ninth Circuit should therefore reverse that decision. See id. The court in
Traweek identified the issue before the court as "whether a union standing alone can bring a § 501
suit as an initial matter." Bldg. Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d
500, 506 (9th Cir. 1989). The Traweek court thus never specified that it was considering only
section 501(b). See id The District Court for the Central District of California acknowledged as
much, just one year before its Roselli decision:
Although Plaintiff argues that the Ninth Circuit only precluded a union suit under
section 501(b), and not under section 501(a), the Court disagrees. The Ninth Circuit
clearly meant to preclude suit under section 501 in its entirety. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Traweek, as precluding a union
from bringing a suit under § 501.
Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Rosselli, No. CV 08-2777-JFW (PLAx), 2008 WL 3342721, at *3
(C.D. Cal. July 22, 2008) (citations omitted) (holding that the court was bound by the Traweek
decision and could not allow a union to sue under section 501).
Other district court opinions have found an implied right of action in section 501 for unions.
See, e.g., Va. Int'l Terminals, 914 F. Supp. at 1339-40; Morris v. Scardelletti, C.A. No. 94-3557,
1995 WL 120224, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 1995); Teamsters, Local 764 v. Greenawalt, 880 F.
Supp. 1076, 1080-81 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Int'l Ass'n v.
Benjamin, 776 F. Supp. 1360, 1364-66 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Glenn v. Mason, No. 79 Civ. 3918
CES, 1980 WL 140904, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1980); Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v.
Orr, No. CIV-1-76-86, 1977 WL 1661, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 18, 1977); In re Johnson, 139 B.R.
163, 172 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
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II. CONGRESS DID NOT CLEARLY INTEND TO CREATE AN IMPLIED RIGHT OF
ACTION ALLOWING UNIONS TO SUE UNDER LMRDA SECTION 501
Although every court that has addressed whether section 501 provides an
implied private right of action for unions purports to conduct a straightforward
analysis of Congress's intent by examining the statute's language, structure,
and circumstances of enactment, several of the courts-those that find an
implied private right-are in error. 55 The Ninth Circuit's analysis-and the
analysis of the concurring district courts-exposes the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits' misguided resistance to the Supreme Court's restrictive implied right
of action jurisprudence. 56 In the past thirty years, the Supreme Court almost
never has found an implied right of action. .0
In light of this trend, the more tenable reading of the statute is that Congress
did not intend to provide an implied private right of action for unions to sue
their officers under section 501. Examining the three aspects of section 501
that have divided the courts supports this conclusion. They are: (1) the
provision of an express right of action for union members; (2) the requirement
that a union member demand the union take action against the breaching
officer before a union member can sue; and (3) the meaning of section 501(a)'s
standards governing a union officer's federal fiduciary duties. 59 Further, even
if the statute is ambiguous, constitutional principles command that courts be
hesitant to find an implied right of action.' 6
A. LMRDA Section 501 's Language and Structure Do Not Prove that
Congress Intended an Implied Right ofAction
1. Express Right ofAction for Union Members
Section 501(b) expressly provides union members a private right of action to
sue union officers who breach the fiduciary duties described in section
501(a). The Ninth Circuit found this plain language to be conclusive
evidence that Congress did not intend an implied right of action, 162 while both
the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits cited the express remedy as evidence that
155. See supra Part I.C.2.
156. See supra Part I.C.1.
157. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 781-82.
158. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20-22
(1979) (stating that a right of action should not be implied by courts in most cases); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1978) ("[W]hen Congress wishe[s] to provide a private
damages remedy, it kn[ows] how to do so and [does] so expressly.").
159. See 29 U.S.C. § 501 (2006); see also supra Part I.C. (discussing cases that have resulted
in opposing interpretations of section 501).
160. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742-47 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 501.
162. See Bldg. Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500, 506
(9th Cir. 1989).
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Congress intended to create an implied right of action.' 63 The Supreme Court
has long admonished courts to be wary of finding congressional intent to create
an implied right of action in a statute containing an express right of action.,
64
Accordingly, the Court has repeatedly rejected claims that additional implied
rights of action should be read into statutes that expressly include other
enforcement mechanisms. 165  The Court in Alexander v. Sandoval even
suggested that an express remedy may preclude finding an implied right of
action in a statute even if other aspects of the statute support a finding of
congressional intent to imply a private right of action.' 66 Thus, the Supreme
Court, in effect, has established that an express right of action is the strongest
evidence of Congress's intent.
The Eleventh and Seventh Circuits' reasoning represents a departure from
clear Supreme Court precedent. 167 Instead of restricting the implied right of
action inquiry when the statute contained an express right of action, these
courts did just the opposite, using it as evidence to find an implied private right
of action.' 68 There were two instances in which the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits used the express right of action as evidence of an implied right of
action. In the first instance, both the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits reasoned
that it was natural that the union's right of action was implicit because a
derivative remedy for union members was more extraordinary and thus
required express statutory language. 169 Aside from departing from precedent,this argument is a weak indicator of congressional intent because it begs the
163. See Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 287 (7th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 442 (2009); Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Statham, 97 F.3d
1416, 1419-21 (llth Cir. 1996).
164. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979);
see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 781-83 (noting the Supreme Court's thirty-year history
of limiting claims of implied federal remedies).
165. See, e.g., TAMA, 444 U.S. at 20-21 (reasoning that the statute's criminal and
administrative remedies and other express public rights of action demonstrated that Congress did
not intend a private right under the statute).
166. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001). The district court in United
Transportation Union v. Bottalico employed a presumption against finding an implied right of
action when the statute provided an express right of action and concluded that no other aspect of
the statute was sufficient to rebut the express right of action. United Transp. Union v. Bottalico,
120 F. Supp. 2d 407, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
167. See supra Part I.C.2.
168. Ward, 563 F.3d at 287 ("The derivative action created in subsection (b) for individual
union members reinforces rather than undermines the implication arising from the text of
subsection (a)."); Statham, 97 F.3d at 1421 ("We should not infer from the mention of individual
suits that Congress did not intend to give unions a cause of action.").
169. Ward, 563 F.3d at 287 ("It was necessary for Congress to make this derivative cause of
action explicit because there is nothing in subsection (a) to suggest that union members
themselves could sue for fiduciary violations committed against the union."); Statham, 97 F.3d at
1421 ("It is far more in keeping with the statute as a whole to conclude that... Congress thought
it implicit that the unions could enforce those rights in court. Allowing the individuals to assert
the unions' claims was more extraordinary and therefore had to be spelled out.").
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question: Congress intended the union right of action because it was implicit in
the statute; therefore, Congress intended an implied right of action.•
70
In the second instance, the Seventh Circuit held that the LMRDA's express
remedy evidenced congressional intent to create an implied right of action for
unions because the express remedy for members was a derivative of the
union's right of action. Just like a shareholder's derivative suit in corporate
law, the court reasoned, the union member's suit must be based on a claim the
union could have brought, which suggests that the union could sue in its own
right. 72 However, section 501 is a statutory claim unique from a shareholder's
derivative suit, 173 and even if a union member is required to sue based on a
claim the union could have pursued, section 501 does not require that the
union's action and the member's action be litigated in the same forum. 17 4 For
example, a union may have a state-law cause of action that a member could
enforce in federal court under section 501, but the union would not be able to
invoke federal jurisdiction based on the same claim.175 The parallel remedies
for unions and union members are not necessarily anomalous; this is the
framework Congress expressly created and thus most likely intended.
Looking to the context of the statute to illuminate the text, 17 6 the legislative
history also makes clear that the general purpose of the entire LMRDA was to
protect the rights of union members and to empower them in dealing with
170. See Ward, 563 F.3d at 287; Statham, 97 F.3d at 1421. The extraordinariness argument
presented by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits is also weak because by 1959, derivative
remedies were a common method of enforcing fiduciary duties in the form of shareholder
derivative suits against breaching corporate officers. See Ward, 563 F.3d at 287; Statham, 97
F.3d at 1421; see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 & nn.4-5 (1970) (noting that the
first shareholder's derivate-type suit was decided in 1856 and that such suits have continued
successfully since then). Thus, by analogy, union member suits were not out of the ordinary.
171. Ward, 563 F.3d at 288.
172. See id.; DEMOTr, supra note 5, at §§ 1.1, 2.2.
173. See 29 U.S.C. § 501. In both the House and Senate subcommittee hearings on their
respective bills, some members of Congress and all testifying union leaders attempted to
distinguish union officers from corporate officers or bankers in assessing the fiduciary duty
provisions. See, e.g., Labor-Management Reform Legislation: Hearing on S. 505, S. 748, S. 76,
S. 1002, S. 1137, and S. 1311 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Pub.
Welfare, 86th Cong. 240 (1959) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Cooper) (urging
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce representative to acknowledge a difference between the fiduciary
duty of corporate officers and the fiduciary duty of union officers because corporate officers are
driven by securing profit and union officers are striving "to gain certain advantages for its
members"); House Hearings, supra note 41, at 1490 (statement of George Meany, President,
AFL-CIO) ("There is no proper analogy between a labor union and a corporation or bank.").
Given the differences between corporate and union fiduciary duties, Congress likely did not
intend section 501 to be analogized strictly with corporate law. See House Hearings, supra note
41, at 1490; Senate Hearings, supra, at 240.
174. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (acknowledging the union's right to sue union officers,
but declining to specify how relief may be sought).
175. See United Transp. Union v. Bottalico, 120 F. Supp. 2d 407,409 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
176. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001).
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union officers. 17 7  Giving power to union members was the mechanism of
Congress's choice to halt union corruption with limited federal involvement. 178
Providing union members with a right of action against union officers for
breach of fiduciary duties, but not providing a right of action for the union
itself, is therefore consistent with the premise of the LMRDA. 179  Further,
members of Congress spoke of union member suits as the method of enforcing
the fiduciary duty.180 Congress never spoke of union suits in federal court, and
a Senate bill allowing union suits never escaped committee.,
81
2. Requirement that the Union Refuse to Act First
Section 501 requires a union member to demand that the union take action
against its malfeasant officer before the union member can sue.182  The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that this language showed Congress's preference
that the union sue; therefore, Congress must have intended that the union be
able to sue in federal court. I83 While this argument has logical appeal, the
177. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Santamaria, 162 F. Supp. 2d 68, 78 & n.6 (D. Conn.
2001); Bottalico, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 409-10; Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Spear, Wilderman,
Borish, Endy, Spear & Runckel, 995 F. Supp. 564, 570 & nn.10-12 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that
multiple enforcement provisions in the LMRDA allow union members to sue or to initiate the
enforcement action).
178. See Mallick v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 749 F.2d 771, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 828-30 (9th Cir. 1968).
179. See Mallick, 749 F.2d at 777; Phillips, 403 F.2d at 828-29.
180. See House Hearings, supra note 41, at 1614 (statement of Sen. Barry Goldwater) ("All
209(b) does, however, is to permit a union member to sue, for the benefit of the union, any union
officer or employee who, it is alleged, has embezzled, stolen, or unlawfully and willfully
abstracted or converted any of the union's property or funds."); id. at 2431 (statement of James
Carbray, International Representative, United Steelworkers of America) ("Now, Mr. Chairman,
dealing with section 209(b), this authorizes suit in Federal district court by a member of the
union, against any officer or employee of the union for alleged embezzlement, theft, and so on.");
S. REP. No. 86-187, at 87 (1959) ("The committee bill would become an effective labor reform
measure if it ... [i]mposed fiduciary obligations, enforceable by union members, on the officials
of labor unions."), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 483;
105 CONG. REC. 6527-29 (1959). During the subcommittee hearings, A.J. Hayes, International
President of the International Association of Machinists, interpreted the Senate bill's fiduciary-
duty enforcement provision to require that unions sue in state courts. See House Hearings, supra
note 41, at 1400-01. Mr. Hayes commented, "It is one thing to require a union governing board
to institute a restitution suit within 4 months of the request to do so" if the union officer was
convicted of a crime, but another thing to initiate suit on unfounded allegations. Id at 1401
(emphasis added). Restitution, or a suit for unjust enrichment, is a state common-law cause of
action. J. Daniel Plants, Note, Employer Recapture of ERISA Contributions Made by Mistake: A
Federal Common Law Remedy to Prevent Unjust Enrichment, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 2000, 2014
(1991).
181. See S. 748, 86th Cong. § 301 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA, supra note 31, at 109-10.
182. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b)(2006).
183. Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416, 1419-20 (11 th Cir. 1996) ("[I]t
would in fact frustrate congressional intent to relegate the union to state remedies. The legislative
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inquiry mandated by the Supreme Court is to ascertain what Congress
intended, not what the reviewing court believes the law should be.184 As
reasoned by a majority of the district courts that have considered this issue,1 85
Congress likely intended for unions to avail themselves of other remedies,
either internally or in state court, while permitting only union members to sue
in federal court. I86 The Eleventh Circuit rested its conclusion on the House
committee report and the minority view in the Senate committee report.1 87 The
Eleventh Circuit, however, misread both. 188  The Senate minority view
expressed concern about union members' inability to sue union officers,1 89 and
history of the LMRDA shows that Congress enacted the fiduciary provisions of section 501
because existing state law remedies for union officials' misconduct were inadequate.").
184. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001).
185. See supra Part I.C. I.b.
186. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Santamaria, 162 F. Supp. 2d 68, 77-79 (D. Conn. 2001);
United Transp. Union v. Bottalico, 120 F. Supp. 2d 407, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Spear, Wilderman, Borish, Endy, Spear & Runckel, 995 F. Supp. 564,
573 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Safe Workers' Org., Chapter No. 2 v. Ballinger, 389 F. Supp. 903, 907 (S.D.
Ohio 1974). Unions and union members can pursue remedies under state law against malfeasant
union officers because the LMRDA does not preempt state law, except as explicitly provided in
the statute:
Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall reduce or
limit the responsibilities of any labor organization or any officer.. . [or] take away any
right or bar any remedy to which members of a labor organization are entitled under
such other Federal law or law of any State.
29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006); see also Paul v. Winco Foods, Inc., 156 F. App'x 958, 959 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that a state breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim was not preempted by section 501 of
the LMRDA).
187. See Statham, 97 F.3d at 1420-21 (reasoning that by providing for union rights under the
federal statute, Congress also intended to permit enforcement of those rights in federal court); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 86-741, at 81 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA,
supra note 31, at 839; S. REP. No 86-187, at 72 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 468.
188. See Santamaria, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 78-79; Bottalico, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 409-10; Spear,
995 F. Supp. 564 at 570. The only other court to assert that the legislative history supports
finding an implied right of action for a union was the District Court for the Southern District of
New York in 1980, which misread the Senate committee report minority view. Glenn v. Mason,
No. 79 Civ. 3918 CES, 1980 WL 140904, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1980); see also S. REP. No
86-187, at 72 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at 468.
The Statham court cited Glenn favorably. Statham, 97 F.3d at 1420. Notably, the Ward court
refused to consider legislative history. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Ward, 563
F.3d 276, 288 n.9 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 442 (2009).
189. S. REP. NO. 86-187, at 72 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA,
supra note 31, at 468. The Senate report minority view states:
The committee bill professes to recognize the fiduciary nature of the union official's
relation to his union and its members, but makes no provision to establish such
relationship, to impose the duties of a fiduciary on union officials, or to give union
members any remedy for a breach of the fiduciary obligation.
In virtually every State in the Nation, the officers and directors of a corporation are
made fiduciaries by statute .... Under these statutes, stockholders are given the right
to enforce the fiduciary obligation through a suit in the courts....
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the House report stated that it chose to define a fiduciary duty in federal law
even though state common law already did.19° The legislative history shows
that Congress believed that unions had adequate state remedies. 191 In fact, in
Only one State has enacted a statute imposing fiduciary obligations on union
officials and giving union members a right to sue in the event of any breach thereof...
[T]he omission of any enforceable fiduciary provision from the committee bill
constitutes a failure to provide what could be the most effective possible device for
enabling rank-and-file union members themselves to control financial misconduct on
the part of their officials.
Both the McClellan Bill (S. 1137) and S. 748 contain provisions designed to impose
fiduciary obligations on union officials and to give union members a right to sue in the
federal courts for breach thereof It is our intention to offer on the floor of the Senate,
amendments designed to fill this unjustifiable vacuum.
Id. (emphasis added).
190. H.R. REP. No. 86-741, at 81 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA, supra note 3 1, at 839. The House report states:
We affirm that the committee bill is broader and stronger than the provisions of S.
1555 which relate to fiduciary responsibilities. S. 1555 applied the fiduciary principle
to union officials only in their handling of "money or other property" (see S. 1555, sec.
610), apparently leaving other questions to the common law of the several States.
Although the common law covers the matter, we considered it important to write the
fiduciary principle explicitly into Federal labor legislation....
The general principles stated in the bill are familiar to the courts, both State and
Federal, and therefore incorporate a large body of existing law applicable to trustees,
and a wide variety of agents....
Id. (emphasis added).
191. See id. ("Although the common law covers the matter, we considered it important to
write the fiduciary principle explicitly into federal labor legislation."). Senator John F. Kennedy
commented that state law remedies for unions were adequate:
Traditionally, questions of fiduciary relationships have been decided in State courts
under the common law....
' .* It is proposed to add a Federal remedy, even though, as I understand the
amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, he would continue the State remedy.
In my opinion, the State laws, as the Senator from North Dakota said last year, are
adequate.
105 CONG. REc. 6525, 6527 (1959) (statement of Sen. John F. Kennedy) (remarks of other
senators omitted); see also id. at 6526 (statement of Sen. Sam Ervin) ("So far as my personal
experience is concerned, I believe this matter is already covered by law in all the States."); cf
House Hearings, supra note 41, at 1604 (statement of Sen. Barry Goldwater) (stating that the
Senate bill was so inadequate that a union member would be better off bringing suit in state court
under the broader fiduciary duties provided by state law). But see Senate Hearings, supra note
176, at 810 (article submitted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (conceding that all states have
laws dealing with fiduciary duties, but that union officers might not be considered fiduciaries by
all states).
During floor debate in the Senate, Senator Barry Goldwater said that "while [my lawyers
advised me] State laws are adequate, they are not specific"; they do not address labor unions
directly. 105 CONG. REC. 6527 (statement of Sen. Barry Goldwater) (alteration in original). He
continued,
I know of no existing law which makes possible the recovery of funds which are
improperly taken from a labor organization by one of its leaders. For instance, the vast
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most section 501 cases, the union also asserts state-law claims, such as fraud,
conversion, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust
enrichment, by invoking the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction. 192
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits concluded that allowing only union
members to sue in federal court only after the union refused to sue created a
strong incentive for unions to refuse in order to invoke federal jurisdiction. 193
Assuming there is any merit to this, the argument that the demand requirement
functions less effectively if unions cannot sue in federal court is more
probative of determining which approach is better policy than determining
Congress's intent. 194 And the Supreme Court has made it clear that policy is
an improper basis for finding an implied right of action.
1 95
3. Defining a Fiduciary Duty Under Federal Law
The Eleventh Circuit expressly, and the Seventh Circuit implicitly, relied
partially on section 501(a)-the definition of the federal fiduciary duty-in
finding that unions should have access to federal courts to enforce that federal
duty. 196 The Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval, however, stressed that
congressional intent to create a substantive private right-for example,
obligating union officers to act in accord with a defined fiduciary duty for the
benefit of union members-is not a sufficient basis upon which a court may
sums of money which Dave Beck [former president of the Teamsters union] took from
his union can never be recovered by law, according to my understanding.
Id. at 6528. Senator Goldwater did not elaborate on who he envisioned suing Beck to recover the
money, but he may have assumed that the Teamsters would not sue Beck for recovery given the
McClellan Committee hearings. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 533-39. Just as Senator Goldwater
expressed concerns about union members' inability to sue, this passage can be read as consistent
with Congress's belief that there were remedies available for unions in state courts. See S. REP.
NO. 86-187, at 72 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 31, at
468.
Contemporary commentators also concluded that remedies are available for unions under state
law. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of
1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 827 (1960) ("Despite the scarcity of direct precedent, it seems plain
that all union officers and employees have always been subject to the usual common-law
fiduciary duties of an agent. Violations are redressible in the state courts.").
192. See, e.g., Spear, 995 F. Supp. at 573 ("[T]he union has adequate remedies under state
law (notably the supplemental state claims brought in this action, for fraud, breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment).").
193. See Ward, 563 F.3d at 288; Statham, 97 F.3d at 1421.
194. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Santamaria, 162 F. Supp. 2d 68, 76-77 (D. Conn. 2001)
(recognizing that the demand argument has "logical appeal," but that it ultimately fails because
Congress identified the availability of state remedies).
195. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (noting that courts should not
use "a policy matter" to establish a cause of action).
196. See Ward, 563 F.3d at 286-87; Statham, 97 F.3d at 1420; see also 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)
(2006).
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imply a private right of action.' 97 Rather, Congress must have intended to
create a private right of action, a right to bring a case to court. 198 For example,
the Supreme Court in TAMA declined to find an implied right of action for
trust shareholders even though the statute placed "federal fiduciary standards"
on investment advisors. 199 Similarly, in Karahalios v. National Federation of
Federal Employees, Local 1263, the Court refrained from finding an implied
right of action even though federal law created a statutory right to fair
representation for federal employees. 200 In addition, Congress did not find it
necessary to extend to unions a cause of action under section 501 because state
law remedies already were available to unions.
20 1
The Seventh Circuit's reliance on the language in section 501(a), which
provides that union officers must "account to" the union for profits received
and bans exculpatory clauses, 202 reveals that the Seventh Circuit read into the
statute more than is there. 20 3 The "account to" language in section 501(a) is
part of the definition of the fiduciary duty, which is directed at limiting
, .. 204
officers' misappropriation of union funds. It is logical that the "account to"
language is only definitional and does not grant the union a right of action
205against an officer failing to account to the union. Section 501(b), the
enforcement provision, specifically provides for union members to "secure an
accounting," among other relief.2 6 The exculpatory clause argument is also
weak. The provision voiding exculpatory clauses is not superfluous, nor must
it refer to union-initiated suits in federal court.207  Rather, banning an
exculpatory clause ensures a breaching officer does not assert the exculpatory
clause as a defense in an action initiated by a union member.20 8
197. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286 ("The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has
passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a
private remedy." (emphasis added)).
198. Id. at 286-88 (emphasizing that only the statute itself can create a private right of
action).
199. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17-19, 24
(1979) (concluding that the statute in question only provided trust shareholders with a private
cause of action to void applicable contract provisions).
200. Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989).
201. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
202. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
203. See Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 287-89 (7th Cir.
2009) (showing the court's purported strict interpretation of section 501), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
442 (2009).
204. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(a).
205. See id.
206. See id. § 501(b).
207. See id. § 501(a).
208. See id.
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B. Finding an Implied Right ofAction in Section 501 that Congress Did Not
Intend Violates the Constitution
If a court is too eager to find an implied right of action, it runs the risk of
providing a right of action that Congress did not intend to allow, violating
constitutional principles.20 9  Such a violation is not harmless. 210  As Justice
Powell eloquently stated in his dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago,
improperly implying a right of action violates Article III and the separation of
powers. 2 Because Article III requires that Congress define the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts, 2 courts that erroneously entertain an implied right of
action not intended by Congress aggrandize the judicial branch's power
beyond constitutional limitations. 213  In addition, the judiciary would be
legislating and thus usurping or allowing Congress to shirk its responsibilities
214
under Article I by creating a right of action not authorized by Congress.
These constitutional considerations likely underlie the Supreme Court's
209. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742-43 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Court should "develop more refined criteria which more accurately reflect
congressional intent"). Professor James D. Gordon also contends that it is unconstitutional for the
judiciary to allow a statutory private right of action in the absence of congressional intent, stating:
Adding a private right of action to a statutory section in which Congress did not
provide one is not an act of interpretation; rather, it is an amendment. The Constitution
does not authorize Article III judges to amend statutes, no matter how defective the
statute or how brilliant the amendment.
James D. Gordon, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under the Securities Acts, 10
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62, 66 (2004).
210. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743-44 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that there are negative
effects on the federal system and the democratic process when the judiciary permits causes of
action in the absence of congressional intent).
211. Id. at 740-47; see also Brown, supra note 70, at 647-49, 654; Gordon, supra note 209,
at 66-67. But see Creswell, supra note 70, at 992-93, 996-97 (discounting separation of powers
as a rationale for the restrictive legislative-intent jurisprudence, but noting that federalism and
Article [II's limited jurisdiction support discerning legislative intent); Susan J. Stabile, The Role
of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 879-82 (1996) (arguing that the Court no longer follows a literal
interpretation of the separation of powers and that federal courts may imply rights of action when
"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests").
212. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1; see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
213. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 746-47 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, §
I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court.").
214. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743-45, 747 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. art.
I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."); Kline v. Burk Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226, 234 (1922) ("Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the
Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly
from the authority of Congress.").
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restrictive implied right of action jurisprudence. 215 As recently as the 2008
case of Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the
Court expressed Article III concerns and urged restraint in ascertaining implied
rights of action.2 16 In analyzing section 501, the Ninth Circuit and concurring
district courts have demonstrated the proper restraint required by the
Constitution, 217 but the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits have not.
218
III. REMEDYING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BY ESTABLISHING A MANDATORY
EXPRESS RIGHT OF ACTION PRESUMPTION
A. Courts Should Not Recognize an Implied Right ofAction Under Section 501
Because the Requisite Congressional Intent Is Lacking
As established above, Congress did not clearly intend to create an implied
right of action for unions under section 501.219  Given the constitutional
implications of encroaching on Congress's powers and expanding the
judiciary's powers beyond Article III's limitations, courts must interpret the
scope of statutes narrowly or haphazardly risk an unconstitutional result.
220
This resolution does not harm unions. Unions may still avail themselves of
state-law remedies, 22 and there is no evidence that federal courts provide any
substantial advantage.
222
215. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743-44 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Brown, supra note 70,
at 636 (arguing that the "most plausible explanation" for the restrictive shift in implied right of
action jurisprudence is that "the Court has, in varying degrees, accepted the doctrinal validity of
the criticisms set forth in Justice Powell's Cannon dissent"); Creswell, supra note 70, at 987-89
(suggesting that the Court avoided addressing its constitutional power to imply statutory rights of
action in any majority opinion by restricting its inquiry to congressional intent).
216. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164-65 (2008);
see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
217. See supra Part I.C.1.
218. See supra Part I.C.2.
219. See supra Part II.
220. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 742-47 (Powell, J., dissenting).
221. See supra notes 187, 192 and accompanying text.
222. However, because most labor and employment law is federal, and many unions
transcend state borders, union lawyers likely are more familiar and comfortable with federal law
and federal courts. See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Spear, Wilderman, Borish, Endy, Spear &
Runckel, 995 F. Supp. 564, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("[Llabor law is, in most respects, an area of
exclusive federal concern. ... ); Chester S. Chuang, Assigning the Burden of Proof in
Contractual Jury Waiver Challenges: How Valuable Is Your Right to a Jury Trial?, 10 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 205, 212 n.38 (2006) (noting that most employment-law claims are federal and
that most state employment-law claims tend to be litigated with federal claims in federal court
under federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction).
Further, there may be tactical considerations to litigate in federal court. See, e.g., House
Hearings, supra note 41, at 1898-99 (statement of Martin F. O'Donoghue, General Counsel,
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of
the United States and Canada) (explaining the advantages of filing a diversity suit in federal court
under Illinois common law for a breach of a union officer's fiduciary duty "because of the
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The Supreme Court declined an opportunity to decide the section 501
implied right of action issue this term, leaving the lower courts free to apply
223their own interpretations. Therefore, circuit courts and district courts that
have yet to decide the issue should hold that congressional intent does not
support providing unions an implied right of action.
224
B. The Supreme Court Should Establish a Mandatory Presumption when a
Statute Contains an Express Right ofAction
The circuit split demonstrates that the Supreme Court's implied right of
action jurisprudence is not sufficiently concrete.225 Federal courts may find an
implied right of action even when there is strong evidence that Congress did
not intend to create a right of action.226 The Seventh Circuit in particular took
great pains to stay within the prescribed analysis of Alexander v. Sandoval by
looking only at the text and structure of the statute, but ultimately declined to
227follow the Supreme Court's restrictive approach. Both the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits dismissed the importance of an express right of action and
relied on weaker reasoning to find what the courts presumably thought was
better law. 22 The Supreme Court should adopt a better rule in order to prevent
courts from engaging in judicial activism, especially when the result is
.229
expanding judicial power beyond constitutional bounds.
The Supreme Court has cautioned courts to be reluctant to find an implied
right of action when Congress already has provided for another remedy
expressly.230 Recently, in Alexander, the Court alluded to a presumption that
provides that an express right of action "precludes a finding of congressional
intent" to create an implied right of action, even when other statutory language
231
might suggest otherwise. Despite the Supreme Court's warnings, several
discovery procedure of the rules of Federal procedure which were more facile and better able to
get discovery"). Otherwise, requiring suit in state courts should not hurt unions. See Spear, 995
F. Supp. at 573.
223. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Ward, 130 S. Ct. 442 (Oct. 13, 2009) (No.
09-196) (denying certiorari).
224. See supra Part I.
225. See supra Part II.
226. See Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 293 (7th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 442 (2009); Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Statham, 97 F.3d
1416, 1421 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
227. See Ward, 563 F.3d at 285-89; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286
(2001) (articulating the inquiry for discerning congressional intent).
228. See Ward, 563 F.3d at 285-89; Statham, 97 F.3d at 1420-21.
229. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(discussing the problems with the judiciary taking on a policy role).
230. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 290; Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263,
489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
19-20 (1979).
231. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 290.
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courts considering implied rights of action under section 501 have not heeded
232the Court's command. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, for example,
failed to consider that the express right of action in section 501 might have a
limiting effect.
233
If the Supreme Court does hear this issue, it will have the opportunity to
clearly establish an express right of action presumption, finally resolving the
circuit split in interpreting section 501 that has lasted for over thirty years.234
If a statute contains an express private right of action for one class of plaintiffs
to enforce a certain statutory right, a right of action will not be implied for a
different class of plaintiffs without, in Justice Powell's words, "the most
compelling evidence" 235 that Congress intended otherwise. Applying this rule
to section 501 of the LMRDA, there is no strong evidence indicating that
Congress intended to create an implied right of action in the statute; the
236presumption cannot be overcome.
Establishing this presumption provides much needed certainty in implied
rights of action jurisprudence 237 and does not appreciably harm any
232. See, e.g., Ward, 563 F.3d at 287; Statham, 97 F.3d at 1421; see also cases cited supra
note 154.
233. See Ward, 563 F.3d at 287 ("The derivative action created in subsection (b) for
individual union members reinforces rather than undermines the implication arising from the text
of subsection (a)."); Statham, 97 F.3d at 1421 ("We should not infer from the mention of
individual suits that Congress did not intend to give unions a cause of action."). Although
Statham was decided after Alexander, since 1979 the Supreme Court has cautioned courts to be
more skeptical in finding an implied right of action when the statute provides an express right of
action. TAMA, 444 U.S. at 19.
234. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (illustrating that district courts have split
over their interpretations of section 501 for over thirty years and federal circuit courts have split
over their interpretations of section 501 for fourteen years).
235. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
236. See supra Part H.A.
237. The definite presumption provides three beneficial effects aside from constitutional
power. First, parties will have a better idea before litigation whether federal courts have
jurisdiction over their claims. See Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in
Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REv. 567, 591 (2007) (noting that the judiciary should
strive to maintain consistency and predictability in rendering opinions). Second, judicial
economy will be served by cutting down on the number of federal lawsuits and appeals filed each
year. See supra notes 112, 154 (discussing federal lawsuits filed under section 501). Third,
reining in judicial activism, aside from constitutional issues, creates consistency among federal
courts and enhances the credibility of federal law. See Roberts, supra, at 591. Professor Caprice
Roberts discusses how judicial activism promotes disrespect for the rule of law, stating:
Charges of institutional internal activism arise from underlying concerns about the
judiciary's abilities to gamer respect for the rule of law and maintain a coherent body
of law. These goals are served by opinions that exhibit common law gradualism,
reliability, predictive value, and certainty. Over time, these traits are strengthened
through a tradition of restraint and respect for the judiciary as an institution. Opinions
that depart from precedent, however, weaken these traditions and erode public trust in
the judiciary, even though they may result in fair outcomes.
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party. 238 More importantly, this approach properly balances federal power. 9
This presumption puts Congress on notice that it must fulfill its legislative
responsibilities by expressly creating a right of action if it intends for one to
exist. Ultimately, this presumption provides federal courts with a much-




Section 501 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act has
created a long-running divide in federal courts. The statute provides an
express right of action allowing union members to sue union officers who
breach their fiduciary duty. Many courts have found this express remedy to be
the best evidence that Congress did not intend to create an implied private right
of action for unions. Other courts, however, have found an implied right of
action in the statute permitting unions to sue. The foregoing analysis indicates
that this latter interpretation likely misconstrues Congress's intent. Even if
section 501 of the LMRDA were ambiguous, constitutional principles require
courts to be cautious and err on the side of not finding an implied right of
action. To bring certainty to the Supreme Court's implied right of action
jurisprudence and remedy the circuit split on the meaning of section 501, the
Court should adopt a mandatory presumption that only the most compelling
evidence will enable a court to find an implied private right of action when a
statute already contains an express right of action.
238. In any express right of action situation, the federal substantive right may still be asserted
by the proper class of plaintiffs for whom Congress created the express right of action. See, e.g.,
29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (providing federal jurisdiction for union members to sue union officers
who breach the fiduciary duty defined under federal law). For section 501 certainly, and likely
for other circumstances as well, other parties not granted federal jurisdiction may seek redress in
state courts. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
239. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743-44 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing the danger of
granting the judiciary too much power).
240. See id. at 749 (discussing the need to restrain the power of the courts).
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